Engineering-Grade Security: When Consequences Are Unacceptable
Workshop Objectives
Imagine that you work in a power plant, responsible for a half dozen 5-story-tall boilers. If a cyber-attack makes a boiler over pressurize and explode, the event will most likely kill you and anyone else nearby.
Which mitigation for that cyber risk would you prefer? A mechanical over-pressure valve on each boiler that, when the pressure gets too high, is forced open to release the steam harmlessly? Or a longer password on the computer controlling the boilers?
Most of us would prefer the unhackable physical valve. But, where is the valve in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework? It’s not there. The framework is blind to any mitigation that is not cybersecurity, and the valve is an engineering mitigation, not security.
Addressing cyber risks to physical operations takes more than cybersecurity. The engineering profession has managed physical risks and threats to safety and public safety for over a century but is only beginning to come to grips with cyber threats and beginning to appreciate the unique role of the profession in OT cyber risk management.
In this seminar, Andrew Ginter, VP Industrial Security speaks to the state of the practice regarding cyber threats to OT networks and physical operations.
- Brief introductions to basic automation engineering and cybersecurity concepts.
- An overview of the threat landscape - public reports of cyber-attacks with physical consequences are growing exponentially.
- An introduction to Cyber-Informed Engineering and the body of knowledge being assembled there.
- A few words on modelling risk, and why “standard” risk models need updating.
- An introduction network engineering, which lives at consequence boundaries - and the boundary between engineering and cybersecurity.
- An introduction to Secure Operations Technology - a collection of the most commonly applied network engineering techniques. Join us for a whirlwind tour of the leading edge of OT cybersecurity thinking