



Human System Interfaces and Resilience Interaction

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First: Dr. Boring is my real name. It's not my supervillain name. It's also not a name given to me by Witness Protection Services.

One Big Happy Family: Boring is derived from same surname as Boeing





What is
human
factors and
ergonomics?





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*Study of
humans
interacting with
technology*



HUMAN FACTORS

above the neck

below the neck

ERGONOMICS



What is human factors and ergonomics?

*Study of
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Primarily a U.S. distinction; internationally, the term *ergonomics* is used for both aspects

HUMAN FACTORS
above the neck
below the neck
ERGONOMICS



What is human factors and ergonomics?

Study of humans interacting with technology

What are the Human Factors?

The Operator

Mental & physical abilities and limitations, motivations, enjoyment, satisfaction, personality, experience level...

Task

Ease, complexity, novelty, task allocation, skills, knowledge, repetitive, monitoring, control, mitigation...

Environmental

Noise, heating, lighting, ventilation, radiation, accessibility, habitability...

Health

Stress, headaches, musculo-skeletal disorders...



Performance

Productivity, quality, accuracy, speed, reduced errors, situation awareness...

Interface

Input & output devices, dialogue structures, display objects, navigation, color, icons, commands, graphics, natural language, 3D, touch, haptics, user support, multimedia...

Organizational

Regulatory, training, job, design, politics, roles, shift work...

Comfort

Seating, equipment, layout...



Birth of Human Factors in the U.S.

- **During WWII psychologists were enlisted to help in war effort**
 - Screening aptitudes to determine where conscripted soldiers should go
 - E.g., someone with particularly good spatial aptitude might be assigned to the emerging air force
 - Enhancing training
 - Need to train people very quickly to fill the wartime roles
 - Counseling and clinical needs
 - Help allay the severity of post-traumatic stress (known at the time as being shell-shocked)



National Museum of the U.S. Air Force

- **New technologies were tricky**
 - No amount of training seemed to help master emerging technologies
 - B-17 bomber featured newfangled landing gear
 - Upon landing, pilots kept confusing flaps and landing gear, crashing the planes

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- **Alphonse Chapanis, psychologist from Johns Hopkins University, realized that placement of landing gear and flaps was confusing**
 - The human factors:
 - Levers were behind pilots and not visible
 - Pilots had high workload while landing
 - Plane movement while landing was considerable
 - Chapanis realized that humans could not be adapted to the design—the design needed to be adapted to the human
 - It was nearly impossible to change the engineering (e.g., reposition the levers) of the plane at this stage
 - Would it be possible to make the function of the two levers **intuitive**?
 - The pilots were not confused about what they wanted to do = *they had a pretty clear mental model*
 - The pilots simply couldn't easily distinguish the levers in those circumstances = *limits of human performance*

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
- **Wrong mental model**
 - Training can often reinforce the right way to do something and change mental model if needed
- **Limits of human performance**
 - Humans can show improvement through training, but only to a point
 - There are limits on what humans can do
- **Chapanis addressed this problem by making the lever handles intuitive**
 - Flat horizontal handle = *the shape of a wing or flap*
 - Round handle = *the shape of a wheel*
 - Easy fix that could be retrofitted without major engineering efforts
 - Bonus! No more crashes of planes due to flap/landing gear confusion!
- **Human factors is about designing for the capabilities of the user**






Information Processing


Information Processing in Computers




Information Processing in Humans




Information Processing in Humans




Information Processing in Humans



Information Processing in Humans



Information Processing in Humans



In Simplest Terms


- Each of these functions of human cognition presents an opportunity for error
 - *Input*: Didn't see a brake light
 - *Decision Making*: Got distracted
 - *Memory*: Got confused about right-of-way rules
 - *Action*: Hit the gas instead of the brake
- Each also presents a way for human to adapt or be resilient

We have to design systems around human cognition


Big Picture in Information Processing

Human-Computer Interface (HCI)

- Computer output = human sensation and perception
- Human action = computer input
- It's a feedback loop



Human Factors Design Philosophy



It's not enough to merely design a product. A designer must identify the user and consider the respective abilities, needs, and limitations.

Considering the user enhances **safety, efficiency, accuracy, and effectiveness** of a design. It also increases the **resilience** of the user.

What Does Human Factors Do?

Most commonly, human factors helps design and validate technologies for human use



- Combination of applying knowledge and gathering knowledge

What Does Human Factors Do?

Most commonly, human factors helps design and validate technologies for human use



- Combination of **applying knowledge** and gathering knowledge
 - Known good practices for what makes a design work
 - e.g., properties of good human-computer interface (HCI) such as layout, legibility, colors, navigation, etc.
 - Fed into design process as design requirements

What Does Human Factors Do?

Most commonly, human factors helps design and validate technologies for human use



- Combination of applying knowledge and **gathering knowledge**
 - Each human-system interface application is different
 - Necessary to evaluate the human use of that specific technology
 - Mockups, prototypes, or beta versions run through scenarios with users
 - Performance data collected to determine if it works

APPLY KNOWLEDGE

take what you know that works
for human interactions with
technology and use it to design
system

GATHER KNOWLEDGE

run a user study to learn about
how human interacts with that
technology

Methods vs. Measures

Human factors as a science and practice has thousands of methods

- **Methods** outline *how* to apply or gather knowledge
- The techniques human factors experts use = the process of human factors

Human factors has thousands of measures

- **Measures** outline *what* the resultant knowledge is
- We measure some aspect of the human performance with the technology and use that to determine if the technology works or not for human use

Methods vs. Measures: Thinking Human Factors

Problem: What is the ideal input device for a digital display on a control board—mouse, trackpad, or touchscreen?

- ***Applying knowledge:*** What do we know from what's been done before?
 - Many digital systems currently in nuclear plants predate current input device technologies—*not applicable to generalize current systems*
 - Surrogate systems like aviation decided against touchscreens because of turbulence—*not applicable, because we have minimal turbulence in control rooms*
 - “Gorilla arm syndrome” that arms get fatigued using vertical touchscreen—*applicable finding but not conclusive enough to make design decision*

Methods vs. Measures: Thinking Human Factors

Problem: What is the ideal input device for a digital display on a control board—mouse, trackpad, or touchscreen?




- **Gathering knowledge:** Let's find out from actual operators
 - Put a prototype digital control system in front of operators and see
 - Each operator tries out simple task using mouse, trackpad, and touchscreen
 - Ask them what they liked best—touchscreen
 - See how they performed best—mouse (accidental activations with touchscreen)
- **Applying knowledge:** Design recommendation is for mouse because operator performance was best and that's most important factor for nuclear operations

Human Factors and System Engineering

Applying and gathering knowledge are part of system engineering approach

V-model




Source: International Council On Systems Engineering (INCOSE)

- Applying knowledge helps build the system (*left side*)
- Gathering knowledge helps validate the system (*right side*)

Iterative Design

Often system engineering is done iteratively and called *user centered design*

- Early analysis done to gather knowledge to inform design
- System is designed
- Early designs are tested
- Design improved and implemented
- New design tested
- Repeat



Source: Usability



Key Human Factors Nuclear Regulatory Guides (NUREGs)

Applying knowledge

- NUREG-0700: *Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines*
- Provides a compendium of principles of human factors that should be considered for good design

Gathering knowledge


- NUREG-0711: *Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model*
- Provides a process model for gathering knowledge as part of design and implementation

Note: Similar guidelines found in most industries

Human Factors Methods per NUREG-0711

Planning and Analysis	Design	Verification and Validation	Implementation and Operation
<p>HFE Program Management</p>			
<p>Operating Experience Review</p>			
<p>Function Analysis & Allocation</p>	<p>Human-System Interface Design</p>		
<p>Task Analysis</p>	<p>Procedure Development</p>	<p>Human Factors Verification and Validation</p>	<p>Design Implementation</p>
<p>Staffing & Qualification</p>	<p>Training Program Development</p>		<p>Human Performance Monitoring</p>
<p>Treatment of Important Human Actions</p>			


Human Factors Methods per NUREG-0711



Look familiar?

- The general system engineering “V” Model overlays on the major elements

Human Factors Methods per NUREG-0711




Look familiar?

- This is the “user centered design” process mapped to nuclear power applications


Methods and Measured Revisited

In reality, you use specific methods to gather specific results/measures


- Guided by where you are in the design process, especially when iterative
 - **Formative:** The design is still being formed = early design stage
 - **Summative:** The design is complete and being summarized or validated = late design stage



What We Do in Human Factors at INL



What We Do in Human Factors at INL




Human Systems Simulation Laboratory



reconfigurable,
full-scale,
full-scope,
research simulator

Human Systems Simulation Laboratory




The HSSL is our design environment
— our test lab for human operators and the
systems they use


reconfigurable,
full-scale,
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research simulator

Our Design Testbeds Aren't Just Nuclear Power




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


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
New >




How About Different Interfaces for the Same Systems?




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Advanced Visualizations



Advanced Features Like Intelligent Operator Aides

CVCS COSS

Warning (1 of 1)
 Detected unidentified Loss of RCS Inventory.
 Shot clock: 00:04:11

Diagnosis
 Identified 99.9% probability of leak in Demineralizer Loop.
 System state warrants entering AOP-15.
 Disregard this warning for 5 minutes.

CVCS COSS

Alarm (1 of 1)
 CSIP A Trip or Close Circuit Trouble
 Shot clock: 00:18:37

Diagnosis
 Unable to identify cause of CSIP A Trip.
 System state warrants entering APP-ALB-06.
 Disregard this warning for 5 minutes.

5. Verify charging has been restored

- a. Verify CSIP B current between 25-50 amps.
Status:
 CSIP drawing 45 amps.
- b. Verify Charging header pressure between 2200-2750 PSIG.
Status:
 Charging header pressure is 2703 PSIG.
- c. Verify Charging header flow is between 90 - 105 GPM.
Status:
 Charging header flow is 90 GPM.
- d. Verify RCP seal injection flows are between 8-13 GPM for each seal
Status:
 Seal injection flows are RCP A = 9.0 GPM, RCP B = 9.0 GPM, and RCP C = 9.0 GPM

Automatic Execution is not available. Clear Procedure Procedures List

Turbine Control System Overview

Mode: Online | Turning Gear: Disengaged

Valves

MSV1	CV3	R11	TVS1
MSV2	CV2	R12	TVS2
MSV3	CV1	R13	TVS3
MSV4	CV4	R14	TVS4
	CV5	R15	TVS5
	CV6	R16	TVS6

Speed Control
 Reference: 1800.00 RPM | Speed: 1800.00 RPM
 Target: 1800.00 RPM | Rate: 180.00 RPM/Min

Load Control
 Reference: 1377.21 MW | Load: 1380.80 MW
 Target: 1377.00 MW | Rate: 0.00 MW/Min

Throttle Pressure: 1.027 PSIG
First Stage Pressure: 723 PSIG
Intermediate Pressure: 185 PSIG

Hydrogen Pressure: 75.30 PSIG
Purity: 99.44 %

EHC Supply Pressure: 1600.38 PSIG
Lube Oil Pressure: 31.21 PSIG

Generator Stator Cooling Water Temp: 0.43 F

Reactivity: 97.69 %

Fault Warning: 0

Fault Warning 1

Replacing display with estimated value.
 Unreliable Value: 0.413633

CV3 A

Unreliable: 41.36 %
 Estimated: 6.09 %

Advanced Applications Like Hydrogen Production

TPE HOT STANDBY TPE ONLINE TEDL HOT STANDBY TEDL ONLINE TPE TRIP TEDL TRIP HTSE TRIP EHX-1 VENT ACTUATED HOT WELL HIGH LEVEL HOT WELL LOW LEVEL

42 TPE Flow KPPH **0** TEDL Flow KPPH **589** Adj Tref F **100.1** Rx Power %
61 Hotwell Level % **71** TPE Pressure PSIG **0** Cond Vacuum PSIG **967** Turbine Load Mw

TPE Warming

Discharge
 Main Steam Press FI-1000 **1007.1** PSIG
 Extraction Flow TPE-6 **42.0** KPPH
 Warming Valve TPE-1 **10.0** %
 Control Valve TPE-1 **0.0** %
 Control Mode FC-1000 **AUTOMATIC**

TPE-EHX-1 Shell Side
 Inlet Temperature TT-1001 **314.6** DEG F
 Inlet Pressure PT-1001 **68.4** PSIG
 Outlet Temperature TT-1002 **90.1** DEG F
 Outlet Pressure PT-1002 **70.8** PSIG
 Vent Valve TPE-9 **0.0** %

TPE-EHX-1 Hotwell
 Level LT-1002 **60.7** %
 Level Control Valve TPE-3 **0.0** %
 Drain Valve TPE-10 **0.0** %

TPE-EHX-2 Tube Side
 Outlet Temperature TT-1003 **78.5** DEG F
 Outlet Pressure PT-1003 **70.8** PSIG

H M S SNP Display Selector Supervisory Controls Isolatic
 00:09:20 20

TPE HOT STANDBY TPE ONLINE TEDL HOT STANDBY TEDL ONLINE TPE TRIP TEDL TRIP HTSE TRIP EHX-1 VENT ACTUATED HOT WELL HIGH LEVEL HOT WELL LOW LEVEL

Thermal Power Extraction (TPE) Controls

Extraction Flow FC-1000 **TPE-EHX-1 Vent** **EHX-1 Hot Well Level LC-1002** **EHX-1 Hot Well Drain LC-1002**

Auto Setpoint KPPH Interlock is Armed Auto SEP Level %
 Manual Pos. % Manual Pos. % Manual Pos. % Manual Pos. %

MS Pressure PSIG TPE-1 Position % TPE-3 Position %
 TPE-1 Demand % TPE-9 Demand % TPE-3 Demand %

Thermal Energy Delivery Loop (TEDL) Controls **High Temperature Steam Extraction (HTSE) Controls**


TEDL Flow FC-1007 **TEDL Pump** **HTSE Breaker**

Auto Setpoint KPPH


Manual Pos. % TEDL-1 Position % TEDL-1 Demand %

H M S SNP Display Selector Supervisory Controls Isolation Controls Snap Helper
 00:09:20 20


Advanced Control Room Mockups






Simplified Simulator for Advanced Control Rooms





What We Do in Human Factors at INL








GSE SYSTEMS



Procedure			Failure Events				Time		
Procedure	Step	Substep	TLP	LOOP	LODG	LOB	5th	Expected	95th
PTA	1	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	1	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	1	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	1	c	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	2	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	2	a	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	2	b	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	2	c	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	3	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	3	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	3	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	4	-	-	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	5	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	5	a	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	5	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	5	c	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	6	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	6	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	6	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	6	c	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	7	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	7	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	7	b	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	7	c	Cc	1	0	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
PTA	8	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	8	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	8	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	9	-	-	1	0	0	-	-	-
PTA	9	a	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
PTA	9	b	Re	1	0	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
SBO	3	-	-	1	1	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
SBO	4	-	-	1	1	0	-	-	-
SBO	4	a	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	4	a	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	4	b	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	4	b	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	4	c	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	4	c	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	5	-	-	1	1	0	-	-	-
SBO	5	a	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	5	a	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	5	b	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	5	b	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	5	c	Cc	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	5	c	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	6	-	-	1	1	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
SBO	6	-	Sc	1	1	0	3.01	34.48	115.57
SBO	7	-	-	1	1	0	3.08	9.81	21.9
SBO	7	-	Sc	1	1	0	3.01	34.48	115.57
SBO	8	-	-	1	1	0	2.44	11.41	29.88
SBO	8	-	Ac	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26
SBO	9	-	-	1	1	0	1.32	18.75	65.26



Guideline for Operator Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE)

		<u>Evaluation Phase</u>			
		Pre-Formative (<i>Planning and Analysis</i>¹)	Formative (<i>Design</i>¹)	Summative (<i>Verification and Validation</i>¹)	Post- Summative (<i>Implementation and Operation</i>¹)
Evaluation Type	Expert Review (<i>Verification</i>)	[1] Design Requirements Review	[2] Heuristic Evaluation	[3] System Verification	[4] Requalification against New Standards
	User Study (<i>Validation</i>)	[5] Baseline Evaluation	[6] Usability Testing	[7] Integrated System Validation	[8] Operator Training
	Knowledge Elicitation (<i>Epistemiatio</i>n)	[9] Cognitive Walkthrough (Task Analysis)	[10] Operator Feedback on Design	[11] Operator Feedback on Performance	[12] Operating Experience Reviews

¹Corresponding Phases in NUREG-0711.

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*Typical utility/
regulatory emphasis*

Evaluation Type

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Guideline for Operator Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE)

That ignores a lot of chances to get the interface right

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home
work

In education, we test learning continuously and cumulatively


exam



Guideline for Operator Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE)

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
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


Epistemiation: Capturing Expert Operator Knowledge to Design New System



Bridging Design, Prototyping, and Evaluation





methods

our team **builds**
prototypes of control
room upgrades that we
then **evaluate** through
operator-in-the-loop
studies

measures

Methods and Measures Revisited

Why would you use different methods and measures depending on where you are the design phase?

- Early on, it may be as important to know *why* they didn't do well or didn't like an interface
 - Qualitative feedback from operators helps refine design
 - e.g., “I didn't understand the dialog box and clicked the wrong button” is more useful to design improvement than “2 out of 3 operators clicked wrong button”
- Later on, it is important to know *how* they did to pass the design
 - Quantitative feedback gives objective measures of performance
 - e.g., operators completed task using interface within the tech spec time limit
 - e.g., operators completed task with no critical errors

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In Sum: Designing for Human Resilience

1. Understand human limitations
2. Understand what humans are good at
 - Automating the human out of the system may not be the best solution
3. Prototype your system and test actual human performance
4. Identify opportunities for preventing and recovering from error traps

Questions?
ronald.boring@inl.gov