



# Building Defensible Architectures for Critical Infrastructure

Dr. Jacob Benjamin

**Director of Professional Services**

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# FIVE CRITICAL CONTROLS



## ICS CYBERSECURITY CRITICAL CONTROLS

01

ICS Incident Response

02

Defensible Architecture

03

ICS Network Visibility and Monitoring

04

Secure Remote Access

05


Risk Based Vulnerability Management

# 02

## A DEFENSIBLE ARCHITECTURE

The resources and technical skills required to adapt to new vulnerabilities and threats should not be underestimated.

Removing extraneous OT network access points



Mitigating high risk vulnerabilities



Maintaining strong policy control at IT/OT interface points



The people and processes to maintain it



# ICS/OT CYBER SECURITY ISSUES



**Cv** **CHERNOVITE**  
SINCE 2021

**ADVERSARY:**  
+ Unique Tool Development

**CAPABILITIES:**  
+ Uses ICS-specific protocols for reconnaissance, manipulation, and disabling of PLCs  
+ PLC credential capture, bruteforcing, and denial of service

**VICTIM:**  
+ Oil & Gas, Electric Utilities, and other industries may be targeted  
+ Asset owners with Schneider Electric, Omron PLCs, CoDeSys-based PLCs, as well as any OPC UA operations

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**  
+ Uses victim PLCs, engineering workstations, and PLC control software for lateral movement and manipulation

**ICS IMPACT:**  
+ Loss of safety, availability, and control; manipulation of control  
+ ICS Kill Chain Stage 2 - Install/Modify; Execute ICS Attack

**ENOTIME**  
SINCE 2014

**VICTIM:**  
+ Oil & Gas, Electric Utilities  
+ Middle East, North America

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**  
+ Virtual Private Server and compromised, legitimate infrastructure  
+ European web hosting providers  
+ Asian shipping company

**ICS IMPACT:**  
+ execute disruptive ICS  
+ ICS incident

**EL** **ELECTRUM**  
SINCE 2016

**ADVERSARY:**  
+ Assessed links with SANDWORM APT, now appears independent

**CAPABILITIES:**  
+ Unique RAT & malicious wiper modules

**VICTIM:**  
+ Electric Sector  
+ Ukraine, Europe

**INFRASTRUCTURE:**  
+ Leveraged servers hosting many additional services such as TOR

**ICS IMPACT:**  
+ Executed control system portion of 2016 Ukraine power event, deployed CRASHOVERRIDE designed to manipulate electric transmission equipment

ICS/OT Systems, Networks, & Vulnerabilities are Very Different from IT/IOT

Specialized Threat Groups Target ICS/OT Systems With TT Specific to the Environments

Be Significant Impacts Safety, Environment, & Revenue

ICS/OT SECURITY INVESTMENTS SIGNIFICANT


RITY

# DEFENSIBLE ARCHITECTURE




It is the human element that allows a defensible architecture to become a defended architecture.


Defensible Architecture Criteria	
	Full Visibility
	Hardened Assets
	Flows Enforced
	Rapidly Isolated
	Defended



Limited OT Visibility



Poor Segmentation




External Connectivity to OT

# ASSET VISIBILITY



A comprehensive inventory is essential for any monitoring, threat correlation and effective vulnerability management



Build **asset inventory depth** through “operations safe” passive collection and **device level detail**

- Establish asset profile baselines for connected integrations with firewall and CMDB systems
- Group assets in a visual map with customizable zones for easier cyber-ops management
- See historical changes with timeline views to spot unexpected activity

# ICS PROTOCOL & TRAFFIC ANALYSIS



Proper traffic dissection and inspection requires in depth protocol coverage – assets and threats remain hidden until their communications are exposed




Improve the **accuracy** and **understanding** of devices in your environment

- Full support across most industrial vendors, equipment, and protocols
- Capture, analyze, and investigate device communications
- Monitor for remote connections, search historical activity

# THREAT DETECTION



Adversaries evolve their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) with subtle behaviors lost in the noise without AI (Actual Intelligence) – creating alert fatigue



High signal, low noise intelligence-based detections mapped against MITRE ATT&CK for ICS :


- Curated Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), malicious IPs, domains, and hashes from Dragos Intelligence
- Anomalous traffic patterns and baseline deviation alerts
- Composite detections from TTP analysis of threat groups and attacks



# ACCELERATED RESPONSE



When faced with a potential incident, clear and carefully vetted guidance can mean the difference between quickly restoring operations or making the situation worse



Provide responders with the tools to **triage** and **investigate** potential incidents

- Incident response playbooks with OT-centric guidance from industry experts
- Collect evidence and organize by case in the analyst investigation workbench
- Centralized forensics and timeline views to coordinate across OT and IT teams

# VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT

- Visibility enables risk-based approach
- Possible Vulnerability Actions
  - Immediate Action
  - Limited Action
  - Possible Threat
  - No Action
  - Hype

**Vulnerabilities**

10 Vulnerability Detections  
5 Unique CVEs

47  
PRIORITIZED AS "NOW"

32  
CRITICAL CVEs

96%  
LOW/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE

Title	CVE	CVSS	Risk Level	Confidence	Priority	First Detected	Last Detected	Asset
<input type="checkbox"/> Treck TCP/IP Stack	CVE-2020-25066	9.0	High - 4	High	Next	2020-12-18	2020-12-21	proc-hse 10.50.7.29
<input type="checkbox"/> Schneider Electric Essergy T300	CVE-2020-7561	8.6	High - 4	High	Next	2020-11-19	2020-12-11	selkasegfrt 10.50.6.32
<input type="checkbox"/> Siemens Embedded TCP/IP Stack Vulnerabilities (AMNESIA-2)	CVE-2020-13988	7.5	Medium 3	Low	Next	2020-12-11	2020-12-16	smr180frt 10.50.6.180
<input type="checkbox"/> GE UR Series Relays Denial of Service	CVE-2018-5475	6.3	Critical - 5	High	Next	2018-02-26	2021-01-06	gr-w-003 10.50.7.200
<input type="checkbox"/> SEL AcSELerator Architect	CVE-2018-10604	5.1	Low - 2	Low	Next	2020-11-25	2020-11-30	selbfrtA 10.49.6.44
<input type="checkbox"/> OSloft PI Interface for OPC XML-DA	CVE-2013-0006	4.2	High - 4	Medium	Next	2013-01-09	2020-11-20	hobolan-frt 10.41.0.50
<input type="checkbox"/> WECON PLC Editor	CVE-2020-25177	4.1	High - 4	Medium	Next	2020-12-01	2020-12-02	plc-over-rt 10.41.0.11
<input type="checkbox"/> Netlogon Vulnerability "Zerologon"	CVE-2020-1472	3.8	Critical - 5	High	Next	2020-08-17	2020-12-24	wisner0456 10.41.1.12
<input type="checkbox"/> HMS Networks Ewon Flexy and Cosy	CVE-2020-16230	2.1	Medium 3	High	Next	2020-09-18	2020-12-23	hmsfrtA 10.11.48.9
<input type="checkbox"/> Cisco IOS XR Software DVMRP Memory Exhaustion	CVE-2020-3566	2.0	High - 4	High	Next	2020-08-29	2020-09-04	router-frt-prod 10.0.0.1

NOW: Requires immediate action  
**2%**

NOW




NEXT: Limited threat vulnerabilities  
**68%**

NEVER: Possible threat (monitor)  
**30%**

# SEGMENTATION AND FLOW ENFORCEMENT



A harsh truth is that prevention is ideal, but not guaranteed. Preventative countermeasures atrophy over time.




# ZONE DEFENSE

Safety Conduit

PCS Conduit

MGMT Conduit



# COLLAPSIBLE INFRASTRUCTURE



Allows for rapid isolation and the ability to go into a defensive cyber position during heightened situations such as DBT scenarios and incident response plans.

## Cyber Load Shed

- Cut all non-local connections
- Quickly apply new firewall rules
- Rely on analog means for safety decisions or critical operations




# FROM DEFENSIBLE TO DEFENDED



Trained personnel, possessing proficient understanding of the industrial process and its cyber dependencies.

## Document & Set Alerts

1. Normal range of set points
2. Communication protocols
3. Sources of approved logic changes



# COLLECTION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

Develop requirements that reflect an understanding of business risks.

1

**DEVELOP NEW REQUIREMENTS**  
TTX, Crown Jewel Analysis, Risk management Processes, Threat Modeling



**DEVELOP COLLECTION PLAN**  
Gap Analysis, Kill Chain Analysis

2

Develop a collection plan using available data sources internal to the enterprise.

Update the collection plan and make adjustments for requirements and collection sources that are no longer relevant.

5

**UPDATE COLLECTION PLAN**  
Remove Unneeded Requirements, Update Changes, Disseminate / Communicate



**IMPLEMENT**  
Environment Manipulation, Process & Playbook Creation

3

Implement the collection plan with a focus on the creation of new procedures and identification of new data sources.

Test and understand the implications of the collection plan to ensure its effectiveness.

4

**TEST**  
Measure & Understand



# EXAMPLE CMF DELIVERABLE

Segment / Level	Asset	Data Type	Kill Chain Phases	Data Storage Location	Data Retention	Follow-On Collection
Corporate Network	Edge Firewall/VPN Concentrator	Firewall Logs	Reconnaissance, Command and Control, Delivery	IT SIEM	12 months	Local Firewall Logs, Firewall Config/Rules
Corporate Network	Engineer Laptops	Windows Event Logs, EDR logs	Exploitation, Installation, Actions on Objectives	IT SIEM	12 months	Registry, Memory, Master File Table (MFT)
Corporate Network	Switches	Syslog	Reconnaissance, Command and Control	IT SIEM	12 months	Configuration and Access logs
Network Core	Routers	Syslog	Reconnaissance, Command and Control	IT SIEM	12 months	Configuration and Access logs
Multiple Segments	Firewall	Firewall Logs	Reconnaissance, Command and Control, Delivery	IT SIEM	12 months	Dragos Platform, Firewall Ruleset
DMZ	Jump Host Server	Windows Event Logs	Reconnaissance, Command and Control, Delivery	OT Log Collector (E.g. Dragos Platform) or Local	12 months	Registry, Memory, MFT
Process Network	Cytiva VIA Thaw	Cloud Logs	Installation, Actions, on Objectives	OT Log Collector (E.g. Dragos Platform) or Local	12 months	Chronicle
Process Network	SKAN Isolator (PLC)	Internal Logging	Installation, Actions, on Objectives	OT Log Collector (E.g. Dragos Platform) or Local	12 months	Controller Logic / Config
Process Network	SKAN Isolator (HMI)	Windows Event Logs	Installation, Exploitation, Actions, on Objectives	OT Log Collector (E.g. Dragos Platform) or Local	12 months	Registry, Memory, MFT
Process Network	EEMS PLCs	Syslog, rsyslog, Internal Logging	Installation, Actions, on Objectives	OT Log Collector (E.g. Dragos Platform) or Local	12 months	Controller Logic / Config



# FIVE CRITICAL CONTROLS - REVISITED



ICS  
CYBERSECURITY  
CRITICAL  
CONTROLS

01

ICS Incident Response

02

Defensible Architecture

03


ICS Network Visibility and Monitoring

04

Secure Remote Access

05

Risk Based Vulnerability Management



# CONCLUSION



Defenders must assume the architecture will never fully be secure instead focus on building a defensible architecture.

- Prevents as much cyber risk as possible
- Facilitates the human defender
  - Full Visibility
  - Hardened Assets
  - Segmented
  - Flows Enforced
  - Collapsible
  - Understood

# FUTURE RESEARCH & OPEN CHALLENGES



The industry has been working to assess adversary capabilities through a keyhole rather than a deeper collection and broader field of vision

- Machine-speed threat intelligence sharing
- Classifying process anomaly vs cyber attack
- OT Incident response collection tools
- Risk Reduction of OT Zero Trust Capabilities

## FURTHER READING

- SANS Institute: The Five ICS Critical Controls Whitepaper
- Dragos 2022 Year In Review Report
- Dragos: Implementing a Defensible Architecture Whitepaper
- Dragos: Recommendations to Implement Secure Remote Access (SRA) Today
- Dragos: Bridging the IT / OT Gap for Effective Incident Response Whitepaper

# Q&A

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS