


CYBER RESILIENCE IN THE ERA OF ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS

Salam Baniahmed, PhD

Eaton Research Labs








EATON RESEARCH LABS...CORE RESEARCH PLATFORMS

INVESTING IN CORE RESEARCH AREA WITH BROAD, LEVERAGED IMPACT ON FUTURE REVENUE GROWTH




ERL is engaged in developing strategic research platforms impacting future Eaton revenues on a time horizon of 3-5 years utilizing Eaton seed investment leveraged to US Govt investment

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ENERGY SYSTEMS (ES) ENABLES SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF MEGATRENDS







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


INTRODUCTION






CYBER KILL CHAIN - GENERAL



GENERIC CYBER SYSTEM




Server B

on

Server A

CYBER INCIDENT STAKEHOLDERS






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8

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HOW "NOT" TO MEASURE THREAT!



Second Annual Hybrid Cyber Security Research Symposium (CARS'22)

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING & MINES

DECS

SECURE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Second Annual Hybrid Cyber Security Research Symposium (CARS'22)









Establish the context	Determine <i>all</i> the elements which compose your system, so your defensive measures will have no blind spots.
Making compromise difficult	An attacker can only target the parts of a system they can reach. Make your system as difficult to penetrate as possible
Making disruption difficult	Design a system that is resilient to denial of service attacks and usage spikes
Making compromise detection easier	Design your system so you can spot suspicious activity as it happens and take necessary action
Reducing the impact of compromise	If an attacker succeeds in gaining a foothold, they will then move to exploit your system. Make this as difficult as possible

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/




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10


SECURITY VS RESILIENCY




NATIONAL CYBER-INFORMED ENGINEERING STRATEGY

National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy from the U.S. Department of Energy

ENERGY Cybersecurity, Energy





"Planned resilience with no assumed security— Expect that any digital component or system may be compromised at some point during its lifecycle, and plan for continued operation during and after a cyber attack that degrades digital controls.
Implement a zero-trust architecture to the greatest degree possible."*

*Figure by: The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Strategy Document https://www.energy.gov/ceser/articles/us-department-energys-doe-national-cyber-informed-engineering-cie-strategydocument

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
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12


RESEARCH EFFORTS ON CYBER RESILIENCY



Goal:

RESEARCH EFFORTS ON CYBER RESILIENCY

- More PE penetration in Energy Systems supports cyber resiliency functions.
- Cybersecurity market is trending towards
 Cyber-Physical Resiliency.
- Embedded cyber-physical PE device design should consider supporting resiliency functions while maintaining security measures at device and system levels.
- Main functions include Automated incident response, aided recovery, post incident forensics.







Thank You for Listening!

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15